Reluctant Experts? A Report on the Seminar "Assessing the Benefits and Costs of the U.S. Military Presence in Japan and South Korea"

Informative, Forthcoming, and Reluctant?

On March 23, the East-West Center in Washington hosted a virtual seminar, "Assessing the Benefits and Costs of the U.S. Military Presence in Japan and South Korea." Six experts from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) discussed their latest report, Burden Sharing: Benefits and Costs Associated with the U.S. Military Presence in Japan and South Korea, and they answered questions from the audience from the U.S., South Korea, and Okinawa/Japan. Okinawa Environmental Justice Project participated in the seminar. 

GAO Experts and East-West Moderator 
Image Source: East-West Center in Washington

For OEJP, the seminar was very informative, and the GAO officers were overall very forthcoming with their answers to the audience's questions, including ones from us. The moderator did a good job navigating the seminar. We learned a lot about the GAO's report itself, the contexts in which the GAO gathered information and created the report, and how the GAO, in general, works with the Congressional Research Services (CRS) and other government departments.

However, we found it puzzling that there was no mention of critical issues of fragile seafloor at the Henoko base construction site in the GAO report and the seminar. In fact, most recent U.S. government reports do not address these issues.

Why have such critical issues been overlooked? Why do U.S. government experts appear reluctant to address them? These are the questions OEJP came up with after attending the otherwise excellent seminar, and these questions need immediate answers. 

OEJP's Interest in the GAO Report

Ever since the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2020 (NDAA FY2020) was enacted in January 2020, OEJP has looked forward to the publication of two reports. One is from the GAO, mandated by Section 1255 of the NDAA, and the GAO just released it earlier in March, and it was the focus of the seminar. The other is one from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), mandated by Section 1266K. And the status of this particular DoD report was revealed during the seminar.

These reports should provide the GAO's and DoD's assessments of the Henoko project in some detail. Section 1255 required the GAO's report to include a description of "other contributions, such as Camp Humphreys and the Futenma Replacement Facility [Henoko project], as determined appropriate by the Comptroller General." Section 1260K required the DoD' to provide a report on "the implementation of the planned distributed lay-down of members of the United States Marine Corps in Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii, Australia, and other locations" and the report should include "(B) any projected limitation due to political, environmental, or other limiting factors."

By the time of the enactment of the NDAA FY 2020, the issues of fragile seafloor at the base construction site and the colossal (or almost impossible) ground reinforcement work required had garnered critical attention in Japan (The Japanese government officially acknowledged them in January 2019). Given the significance of the issues, over the year, they have become a heated subject in the Japanese National Diet, the media, the exchange between the Okinawa prefectural government and the Japanese government. 

Cross-Section of the Fragile Seafloor at Construction Site
Image Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense 

Under pressure, the Japanese government has revealed more information on these issues.  We now know that the target date of completion is sometime in the mid-2030s; the government has to implant 71,000 piles as deep as 70 meters below the water surface into the seafloor to reinforce the seafloor; there is, however, no work ship to carry out such reinforcement work. The Okinawa prefectural government has also sent a letter to the DoD informing these issues.

Thus, OEJP had expected that both the GAO and the DoD reports would address the seafloor issues. However, our interest has been more in the DoD report than the GAO report because the DoD was required to provide information on "projected limitation due to political, environmental, or other limiting factors."  

No Mention of Fragile Seafloor in the GAO Report and the Seminar

The current GAO report identifies six areas of benefits, including "regional stability and security" and "strong alliance." It presents detailed analyses of how much the U.S., Japanese, and South Korean governments have contributed to the presence of the U.S. military in the respective countries in monetary and "in-kind" terms between the calendar years 2016-19. The report is excellent in presenting what it was required by Section 1255 of the NDAA FY 2020 to present. 

However, there are no words such as "seafloor" "ground reinforcement work" to describe the present status of the Henoko project in the report. The GAO report's description of the project remains general, "The [Henoko] plan was initially to be completed by 2014, but local opposition as well as environmental analyses, have contributed to significant delays." (p.23). Also, the GAO report described  the situation of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa as "Several experts said that, given the extent of opposition in localities such as Okinawa, the U.S. military presence in those places might not be politically sustainable. "(p.13) 

During the seminar, thus OEJP submitted the following questions to the GAO experts. 

"Regarding the Henoko (Futenma Replacement Facility) plan, the GAO report states, "The plan was initially to be completed by 2014, but local opposition, as well as environmental analyses, have contributed to significant delays" (p.23). There is no mention of the issues of the fragile seafloor at the construction site requiring massive ground reinforcement work. My questions are twofold:

1) Was the GAO able to collect detailed information on the issues from the Japanese government or the DoD? 

2) If so, has the GAO made any assessment of the feasibility of the plan?

Unfortunately, when the moderator read out our questions, he turned the OEJP's questions into more general ones, omitting the words "fragile seafloor" and "ground enforcement work." Consequently, throughout the seminar, there was no discussion on the specific issues of fragile seafloor and ground reinforcement work and no utterance of these words from GAO experts. (Two other people asked Henoko related questions, with one of them specifically addressing the issues of fragile seafloor)

It is not to say that the GAO report or the experts downplay the various issues of the Henoko project. That the GAO is concerned is evident in that, despite the GAO was requested by the NDAA FY2020 to describe the Henoko project's "contribution," the GAO report reads "local opposition, as well as environmental analyses, have contributed to significant delays." Also, in the Q&A session, the GAO experts addressed some issues associated with the current status of the Henoko project. But their concerns were presented from the U.S. government's point of view. 

Important Information from Q&A Session

While not mentioning the issues of fragile seafloor, during the Q&A session, the GAO experts still provided important information regarding the Henoko project as follows.

1. The GAO acknowledged that when the GAO submitted the report earlier in March, the GAO "knew delays would be beyond the 2030s, and definitely, it seems like to be continuing." 

It is important to emphasize that this timetable "beyond the 2030s" is exclusivly linked to the issues of fragile seafloor and the ground reinforcement work it requires. So, it is logical to assume that the GAO experts had known at least of the seafloor issues by the time of the report's release. 

2. The GAO informed that the DoD had not submitted to Congress a report on the "distribution lay-down of US Marines in the Indo-Pacific Region" requested by Section 1260K of the NDAA FY 2020. The DoD was supposed to submit it sometime in June 2020 according to Section 1260K of the NDAA FY 2020. The GAO explained that once the DoD issues its report, the GAO will review it and make recommendations.

As mentioned above, OEJP expects that this DoD report should provide detailed information on the issues of fragile seafloor and an assessment of the feasibility of the Henoko plan. Section 1260k of the NDAA FY 2020 has specifically required the DoD report to include a description of "projected limitation due to political, environmental, or other limiting factors."

3. The GAO explained that although the current GAO report was not purposed to assess the feasibility of the Henoko plan, the GAO's 2017 report discussed challenges the plan was facing and made recommendations to the DoD. The GAO also informed us that the DoD had not resolved many of the challenges and the GAO still waits for the DoD's response.

The GAO provided two examples. One is the shortness of the V-shape runway of the Henoko base that would reduce the U.S. military's capabilities for emergency landing and the United Nations' use. The U.S. military needs an alternative long runway on Okinawa. The other is the insufficient "training opportunities" for the U.S. Marines transferred from Okinawa to Iwakuni. This situation has forced the Marines to fly back to Okinawa to "complete their training."

The GAO stressed that these issues have to be resolved by the DoD negotiating with the Japanese government.  

4. The GAO explained that the GAO experts could not travel to Japan to conduct an on-site study for the current report due to the COVID-19 pandemic. They did not interview Japanese cournteraparts. They hope that they can travel to the Indo-Pacific regions, including Japan, for follow-up studies. 

The information that emerged in the Q&A session helps us place the GAO report and the seminar in a broader context. 

Excerpt from the 2017 GAO Report

Concluding Notes: Who Will Address the Fragile Seafloor?

From OEJP's point of view, it was disappointing and puzzling that the issues of fragile seafloor and the colossal ground reinforcement work required were not addressed in the GAO report and the otherwise excellent seminar. 

However, if one looks at other reports published by the U.S. government since January 2019, when the Japanese government officially admitted the issues, she or he could see a similar pattern in them. The U.S.-Japan Alliance (June 2019) and The U.S.-Japan Relations: In Focus (May 2019, April 2020, February 2021), published by the Congressional Research Services (CRS), do not address the issues at all. Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress (October 2019), also published by CRS, gives a vague description, "An additional challenge is the physical difficulty of constructing offshore runways for the base." [4] 

U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa and Realignment to Guam (April 2019), published by CRS, provides the most concrete so far but still a limited description of the fragile seafloor: "It was subsequently discovered that underwater soil in the area is less stable than originally thought, leading to more complex building requirements."

One has to wonder why the GAO and CRS (and of courese the DoD) have been so reluctant to discuss these critical issues. (After all, the information on the issues of fragile seafloor and reinforcement work has been available for over the year on the Japanese Defense Ministry's website). Are they waiting for the DoD to tell Congress this troubling news? Is it the case that the Japanese government has not "officially" provided the U.S. government with information on these serious problems? Or is there a lack of transparency in the information exchange between the allies?

These questions need immediate answers. OEJP aruges that the U.S. governemnt's reluctance to address these critical issues allows the Henoko project to drift into needless and endless delays, pushing the U.S. government into a politically and geopolitically uncomfortable corner.  

The feasibility of the Henoko project is slim due to the extremly fragile seafloor. If the Japanese government continues with the project, it will bring about irreversible environmental disaster to Henoko-Oura Bay. Environmental damage from the construction has been painfully evident. 

The Henoko project is already a political disaster in Okinawa. With increasing support from mainland Japan and international civil society, the people of Okinawa continue to oppose the project, which would intensify further the strife between Okinawa and the Japanese government.  Moreover, with the target date for completion now being the mid-2030s or beyond, and with the possibility that construction may not be completed, the project is becoming a geopolitical and strategic liability in an increasingly contentious East Asia (we will report on this topic later). 

The U.S. government, especially Congress, needs to be informed of the absurdity of the Henoko project. The sooner and the more detailed the information Congress receives, the sooner Congress can make the wise decision. OEJP is determined to play its role in this.