Preliminary Reflections on Okinawa's Gubernatorial Election Results: Government-LDP Playbook, Base Issues, and Moving Forward

Okinawa Gubernatorial Election: Lopsided Result

On September 13, 2026, as soon as the voting booths closed at 8:00 pm in Okinawa, all the local media outlets announced Genta Koja as the winner of the Okinawa gubernatorial election over incumbent Denny Tamaki.

Koja's victory was widely anticipated.  The Tokyo government, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), other major political parties, and the mayors of all cities in Okinawa, who are also supported by the LDP, endorsed Koja.  His campaign was well-oiled (read: a lot of money was spent) and well-organized.  As a University of Tokyo graduate, a former national bureaucrat, and vice-mayor of Naha city under an LDP-backed mayor, he has been groomed as a "conservative" Okinawa governor. Koja also benefited from the race's farcical unfolding: Mikio Shimoji, another major but maverick candidate and a former LDP National Diet member considered an obstacle for Koja, dropped out and declared his support for Koja just one day before the official campaign started.

Meanwhile, the Denny Tamaki campaign faced several setbacks.  In March, a tragic boat accident during a 'peace study field trip' in Henoko resulted in the deaths of a high school student and a boat captain, negatively casting his stance against the Henoko base construction.  All Okinawa, which has supported Tamaki and the late Takeshi Onaga's gubernatorial campaigns over the past 12 years, has lost influence.  Tamaki also faced a barrage of negative social media posts, mainly from mainland Japan, depicting him as a pro-China, anti-Japanese politician.

Koja received 423,124 votes, the highest number any candidate for governor in Okinawa has ever received, whereas Tamaki received 276,060 votes, 66,000 fewer than he received in the 2022 election.  The election was lopsided.

 

As an opponent of the Henoko base construction and a proponent of demilitarization and environmental justice in Okinawa, I found the gubernatorial election results deeply disappointing.  Although Denny Tamaki's defeat was expected, I did not anticipate it would be this lopsided.

I am reviewing the results and considering what collective actions we, as Okinawa civil society, can take to overcome these challenges and move forward.  My preliminary thoughts below, from the perspective of a liberal, progressive Okinawan scholar-activist, focus on why it turned out as it did, what it implies, and, more importantly, how we should respond.

The Tokyo Government-LDP "Playbook": Mechanism of Control

First, I see Koja's victory as the result of Koja adopting the playbook of Tokyo government- and LDP-backed candidates for the local economy.  By successfully elevating economic issues as his central agenda and downplaying base issues as secondary, his campaign emphasized his closeness to the central government and his ability to secure more funding from Tokyo than Denny Tamaki's.

This playbook worked for Keiichiro Inamine and Hirokazu Nakaima, Tokyo government- and LDP-backed governors who served during the early years of the Futenma-Henoko controversy.  Inamine's campaign coined the term "kensei fukyo 県政不況 (prefectural administration-inflicted economic stagnation)" to defeat incumbent Masahide Ota, a liberal academic turned governor who opposed the Henoko construction plan, in the 1998 election.  Nakaima, who ran similar campaigns to Inamine's, won over Keiko Itokazu in 2006 and Youichi Iha in 2010, both of whom were considered liberals and opposed the Henoko plan. 

 

This time, the playbook produced an immediate result for Koja. One day after the election, the Tokyo government announced it would increase the FY2027 "Okinawa Promotion Budget" to over 300 billion JPY, up from the 289 billion JPY the Tamaki government had set as its request. 

The Okinawa Promotion Budget was established after Okinawa's reversion to Japan in 1972 to provide grants and disbursements to Okinawa.  Since then, it has funded various projects, including infrastructure works and educational assistance.  However, despite its title "Okinawa Promotion Budget," it does not provide special or extra financial support to Okinawa.  Other prefectures also receive similar national assistance such as "local allocation tax grants" and "national treasury disbursements." The main difference is that different ministries provide local allocation tax grants and national disbursements, whereas the Okinawa Promotion Budget is provided through the Cabinet.  Conversely, the Okinawa prefectural government has to request grants and disbursements from different ministries through the Cabinet.  This centralized structure has enabled the central government (and the LDP) to exert control over Okinawa's economy, both literally and symbolically.  

The Tamaki administration has struggled to meet the 300 billion JPY benchmark for the Okinawa Promotion Budget during his second term (2022~2026) and has reached only the 260 billion JPY range.  This situation frustrated the business sector, especially small businesses, in Okinawa and played a significant role in their rallying behind Koja.
 
What I am very concerned about is that, even though the Tokyo government's economic incentives and maneuvering influenced the election result, the central government and right-leaning media outlets and commentators in mainland Japan are ready to frame Koja's victory around his stance on Henoko construction (he "accepts" the plan) and U.S. military and national security concerns, especially the "China threat." This framing distorts the election and obscures its real meaning for Okinawa's future.

Koja Now Faces Base Issues Up Front
Second, Koja now has to face "base issues" up front, rather than as a bystander.  PFAS contamination, aircraft noise and accidents, crimes committed by U.S. soldiers, military waste and training in the UNESCO World Natural Heritage Yambaru, and environmental destruction are issues that any Okinawa Governor, regardless of political orientation, must address.
 
In this context, his closeness to the central government is a double-edged sword.  If he is seen as weak on U.S. military issues, he will face public backlash and accusations that the government co-opts him.  If he is seen as too tough on the U.S. military, although I doubt it will be the case, the central government can admonish him.  This makes his position more difficult than it appeared during the campaign.

Furthermore, because his campaign was imbued with the "China threat" rhetoric, a narrative also propagated through SNS and the internet from the mainland, Koja has to articulate what he thinks the China threat constitutes as part of the "U.S. base issues."

 

Of course, he can continue to claim that further militarization of Okinawa is necessary because of the "China Threat" or the "Taiwan Contingency." However, he may also have to acknowledge that the legacy U.S. bases in Okinawa are easy targets for China's advanced weapon systems and that the U.S. military and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces may not match them or protect the people of Okinawa.  Such an admission should prompt Koja to draw up evacuation plans for local communities, assuming an attack on Futenma or Kadena.  This would encourage local communities to re-evaluate the "base issues" more critically, as communities on Miyako, Ishigaki, and Yonaguni have done when they realized that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces deployments to their islands made them military targets and required evacuation plans.

Tamaki campaign failed to present the Futenma-Henoko stalemate as it is.
Third, I wish the Denny Tamaki campaign had presented the Futenma-Henoko stalemate as it is: a stalemate caused by real, physical, technical issues.  What has really slowed construction is the soft seafloor at the site, which has made work extremely difficult and probably infeasible, driven costs (taxpayers' money) sky-high, led the U.S. government, including its military, to express serious concerns, and made the return of Futenma extremely difficult.  However, the Tamaki campaign failed to make these points effectively.  Civil society's efforts, including my own, to convey the critical information to the public were also limited and therefore ineffective.  As a result, the technical issue never became a clear focus of the campaign.
 
Meanwhile, the Koja side portrayed the stalemate as caused by Denny Tamaki's staunch opposition to the Henoko base construction, rooted in his left-leaning political ideology and anti-government stance.  The Koja campaign insisted that the Tamaki administration's legal battles with the Tokyo government over Henoko were unnecessary: while they resulted in Tamaki's defeats, they stalled construction.  It also emphasized that the stalemate has caused an economic downturn in Okinawa.  It argued that Koja's demand for the government to set a definite completion timeframe for the Henoko construction should accelerate both construction and the return of Futenma. Apparently, this framing of the Henoko stalemate has convinced voters. 

Both candidates failed to see Okinawa beyond U.S. hegemony.

During the election campaign, while both Koja and Tamaki discussed and envisioned Okinawa as a potential hub for the economy, tourism, cultural exchange, and peace in Asia, they did not articulate or incorporate the evolving global power trajectory from U.S.-dominated unipolarity to multipolarity into their long-term visions for Okinawa.  This was very disappointing to me.  That omission weakens the broader vision they presented and points to a deeper issue Okinawa faces today. 

Decades of intense political investment—both opposing and supporting Henoko base construction and military bases in general—have created significant social and institutional inertia.  For those who oppose them, they reflect the lopsided power relationship between Okinawa and the Tokyo and U.S. governments.  For those who support them, this power relationship has generated economic benefits in land rent, construction, restaurants and bars, and development projects, alongside the immediate burdens of militarization.  For both sides, the base issues represent and reinforce their understanding that U.S. military power is an immutable reality.  This explains why Koja and Tamaki failed to discuss and envision Okinawa beyond U.S. hegemony.  

Civil Society Moving Forward

After this landslide defeat of Denny Tamaki, how can I and those engaged in the peace and anti-militarization movements in Okinawa move forward?  

We still have strong foundations to challenge the Koja administration and the Tokyo government.  We can press Koja to address and resolve the "base issues" through his close ties to the central government.  Using scientific data and government documents, we can insist that the Henoko project is not feasible because of soft-seafloor issues, wastes taxpayers' money, and would keep Futenma operational for the foreseeable future.  We can advocate that Okinawa's sustainable economic future requires better relations with China and other Asian countries, not reliance on Tokyo's handouts.

 

I invite all community and civil society members to share their perspectives, propose new actions, or join our planning efforts for a better and peaceful Okinawa.  Your input and support are crucial as we determine the most effective ways to move forward together.