The Futenma-Henoko Stalemate and Okinawa’s Gubernatorial Election: Why Okinawa Must Look Beyond U.S. Hegemony

The Futenma-Henoko Stalemate and Okinawa’s Gubernatorial Election: 

Why Okinawa Must Look Beyond U.S. Hegemony

Director, Okinawa Environmental Justice Project

Hideki Yoshikawa 

Abstruct

The people of Okinawa confront the unsettling prospect that the long-awaited closure and return of U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station may never materialize. Technical issues have delayed construction of Futenma’s replacement facility at Henoko and have raised serious questions about the project's feasibility. The prospect that the U.S. military may use Henoko while Futenma remains operational has become more plausible. The Futenma-Henoko stalemate is a focal point of the September gubernatorial election. To resolve the stalemate and U.S. base issues, the people of Okinawa must recognize and leverage the vast geopolitical and economic shift from U.S.-dominated unipolarity to multipolarity. Our votes must reflect this crucial awareness.

Introduction

The people of Okinawa today confront the unsettling prospect that the long-awaited promise of the closure and return of U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station may never materialize. The terms of Futenma’s closure and return, laid out in the 1996 “Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Agreement,” are predicated upon the completion of a replacement facility at Henoko-Oura Bay (Henoko base). However, technical issues with soft seafloor at the construction site have delayed construction and have raised critical questions about the project's feasibility. The alarming prospect that the U.S. military may use Henoko not as a replacement but as an additional facility while Futenma remains operational has become more plausible.

Futenma Air Station in Ginowan City
Image Source: Ginowan City

Henoko-Oura Bay Construction Site
Image Source: H. Y.

For opponents of the Henoko base, this scenario is unacceptable, yet fears of its realization are growing. Meanwhile, supporters of the official U.S.-Japan stance that constructing the Henoko base is “the only solution” to eliminate the danger of Futenma look to the Tokyo government to dispel these concerns. As a result, a renewed collective demand for the immediate closure of Futenma has emerged even as deep political disagreements over the Henoko project remain.

The upcoming September gubernatorial election has made the Futenma-Henoko stalemate a focal point in Okinawan politics. The candidates’ election platforms reveal that Okinawa’s public discourse on the Futenma-Henoko issue has been and continues to be framed by the perception that U.S. military power remains an immutable reality. What the overarching framework of the discussions fails to account for is the vastly changing geopolitical and economic landscapes in East Asia and beyond; more precisely, a shift from a unipolar to multipolar order. The people of Okinawa must recognize and leverage this evolving global landscape in order to resolve this stalemate and find a meaningful path for Okinawa’s future.

Henoko’s Short Runways and Demands for Alternative Facilities
Renewed public debate over the Futenma-Henoko issue was spurred by the publication of an article on February 15 by Sumiyo Heianna, a U.S.-based special correspondent for The Okinawa Times.(1)  The article was based on an official U.S. military document released in September 2025, which stated the U.S. military’s position that the Futenma Air Station would not be returned upon the completion of the Henoko base alone. It stipulated that because the proposed runways at Henoko are too short for contingency operations, the Japanese government must secure an alternative airport with a runway of 2,700 meters or longer: “Pursuant to the terms of our arrangement, finalizing the selection of that alternative runway is the responsibility of the Government of Japan, and the Futenma facility will not be returned to Japan until it makes that selection.”

DoD Document shown in Heianna's article
Image Source: Okinawa Times 

To be clear, this is not a new requirement. Securing “contingency use of civilian facilities for long runway operations” is explicitly listed as one of the eight conditions for Futenma’s return in the 2013 Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa—with the completion of the Henoko base serving as the primary condition.(2)  A 2017 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated, “The proposed runway at Camp Schwab will not adequately support these same mission requirements, according to Marine Corps officials. Instead, there will be two 5,900-foot V-shaped runways that... will be too short for certain aircraft.”(3)  The GAO report recommended identifying alternative runways elsewhere, including in Okinawa.

For the Okinawan public—who have long been subjected to the governments’ “Henoko is the only solution” narrative and thus have assumed that Henoko’s completion would automatically mean Futenma’s return—Heianna’s article was a revelation. Given that the feasibility of constructing Henoko had been seriously questioned due to the soft seafloor,(4) the article sparked deep concern that the U.S. military has no true intention of closing Futenma. Furthermore, the U.S. insistence that Tokyo secure a long-runway alternative fueled speculation that Naha Airport in Okinawa would be selected—an outcome that directly undermines Tokyo and Washington’s promise to reduce Okinawa’s military burden.

To counter the political implications of Heianna’s revelation and to calm emerging public anxiety, Tokyo took swift, cautious action. On February 16, Minoru Kihara, Chief Cabinet Secretary, insisted that the government does not anticipate Futenma remaining open once Henoko is completed.(5)  Four days later, on February 20, Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi stated that Futenma would be returned once all agreed-upon conditions were met, insisting that there were “no discrepancies” between the U.S. and Japanese governments.(6)  However, he refrained from providing a target completion date for the Henoko project and remained vague about which civilian facility would serve as the alternative airport in a contingency, merely noting that existing legal mechanisms allow airports to be provided to the U.S. military.

DoD document shown in Heianna's article
Image Source: Okinawa Times

Construction of New Offloading Fuel Facilities at Futenma Air Station

On July 20, Heianna published another report regarding Futenma Air Station.(7)  

Citing a DoD Defense Logistics Agency document released this year,(8) the article revealed the Agency’s plans to construct "Truck Offload Facilities" as a secondary source of aircraft fuel resupply at Futenma, with construction scheduled to begin in March 2027. It stated, "MCAS Futenma does not currently meet the DoD standards for aviation facilities," which require maintaining two distinct fuel-delivery methods. The document explained that "the new facility for commercial transport tank trucks is needed in case the current transfer pipeline becomes inoperable or unavailable."

For many in Okinawa, this plan was viewed not as a routine operational update complying with the DoD’s “Antiterrorism Force Protection standards,” but as a sign that the U.S. military intends to operate Futenma for the foreseeable future.(9) This perception was further reinforced by its continued reliance on the Kuwae Tank Farm in Chatan—a facility originally scheduled for return to Okinawa in fiscal year 2022 or later under the 2013 Consolidation Plan.(10) To local observers, these documents serve as compelling evidence that key elements of the bilateral consolidation agreements will remain unfulfilled.

Legacy Facilities in Okinawa and Evolving Weaponry Systems in East Asia

Coincidentally, the DoD document serves as a stark reminder of how deeply militarization has penetrated Okinawa since World War II, as well as how limited public access to information about this infrastructure is. It also exposes that legacy U.S. military installations have become increasingly vulnerable amid contemporary East Asian security dynamics.

Exposed pipelines near Kurashiki Dam
Image Source: HY

Currently, Futenma Air Station receives aviation fuel from the Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 (a U.S. Army facility in Chatan Town) via a six-mile-long pipeline with multiple sections exposed over water crossings.(11)  The tank farm is part of a vast U.S. military fuel distribution network across the island: offshore tankers connect to mooring facilities off the coast of Kin Bay, transferring fuel via subsea and underground pipeline networks to the Chimu (Kin) Wan and Kuwae Tank Farms. These facilities supply both Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station through an interconnected pipeline system exceeding 110 kilometers across bases and local communities.(12) The island’s militarization extends across the surface and subterranean landscapes, the sea, and the sky.

However, given the rapid advancement of military technology amid East Asia's geopolitical dynamics, these legacy facilities and plans to add "Truck Offload Facilities" as a secondary fuel-resupply mechanism at Futenma will offer little strategic reassurance. China—identified by both Washington and Tokyo as a primary strategic competitor(13) —possesses advanced precision-missile capabilities, placing facilities across Okinawa well within striking range.(14)  If Futenma were to become the target of precision strikes during a conflict, such as a “Taiwan contingency,” minor tactical redundancies like fuel truck terminals or secondary pipelines could not address the base's fundamental operational vulnerabilities.(15) 

These global strategic perspectives on Futenma, while discussed in the local media and academia, have not entered Okinawa’s public discourse on the Futenma-Henoko stalemate. Okinawa’s public discourse has remained narrowly focused on the island.

Team Ginowan Gathering
Image Source: Ginowan City PR

Demanding the Closure and Removal of Futenma: A New Unified Voice or Re-emerging Fractures and Constraints?

On July 26, public outrage over these revelations culminated in a gathering of about 1,000 citizens in Ginowan City.(16)  Organized by Mayor Atsushi Sakima, the Ginowan City Assembly, and other prominent groups in the city, “Team Ginowan” was presented as a unified coalition of Ginowan residents, rallying under the cry: “We Can No Longer Wait.”  In its joint statement, Team Ginowan listed three demands: Immediate closure and return of Futenma Air Station with a fixed, specific deadline set by the Japanese and U.S. governments; Establishment of new policy frameworks and financial aid to support local residents who continue to suffer from dangers of the base; Collaborative planning and execution by the Japanese and Okinawa Prefectural governments for the use of the land after the base is returned. 

The gathering, however, revealed deep political fractures and constraints. First, parties were split over the Henoko construction plan. Although the joint statement adopted at the rally deliberately omitted the phrase “Henoko is the only solution,” Mayor Sakima reiterated his stance that “Henoko is the only solution” during a press conference held just prior to the event.(17)  During a post-event meeting between Mayor Sakima and Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki, Sakima urged the governor to cooperate with advancing the “replacement facility” construction. Tamaki responded that options other than Henoko must be explored.(18)  Alarmed by Sakima’s stance, groups that participated in the gathering and oppose the Henoko plan sent a letter to the mayor, insisting that his lobbying activities contradict the joint statement and requesting clarification.(19) 

Second, the joint statement did not mention Futenma as a potential military target amid East Asia's evolving geopolitics and military strategy.(20)  Instead, the dangers of Futenma were described in terms of noise pollution, aircraft accidents, and PFAS contamination, as they have been in the past. It depicted Okinawa as a historic bridge for trade and interaction between Japan and Asia, and argued that returning Futenma would serve as an economic catalyst for Japan. By avoiding discussion of current regional security concerns, echoing cultural-historical rhetoric, and relying on familiar economic arguments, the statement framed the Futenma issues in the context of Okinawa within a carefully crafted framework of the Japan-U.S.-Asia relationship. This can be interpreted as Team Ginowan’s efforts to avoid causing further distress and fury among the people of Ginowan. But it was also a missed opportunity to highlight the dangers of Futenma and the implications of the Futenma-Henoko stalemate amid heightening geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and Japan and China.

The Futenma-Henoko Stalemate and the Gubernatorial Election

The enduring issues surrounding Futenma Air Station and the Henoko base are focal points of Okinawa’s gubernatorial election on September 13. While the two primary candidates both call for the immediate closure and return of Futenma, they offer contrasting visions for Henoko.(21) Incumbent Governor Denny Tamaki opposes the Henoko plan, citing ongoing construction delays and U.S. insistence on retaining Futenma. He calls for alternative plans. Genta Koja, backed by Tokyo and local municipal leaders, maintains that “Henoko is the only solution,” relying on Tokyo’s formal timeline disclosures to bolster his platform.

Denny Tamaki
Image Source: Tamaki's Election Website

Genta Kojya
Image Source: Kojya's Election Website

　　　

　

Many believe that whoever wins, the Futenma-Henoko stalemate will continue for an uncertain period, though election results will have differing implications. If Tamaki wins, the Japanese government’s political pressure will intensify. Maintaining that Henoko is the only solution, it will proceed with construction at Henoko, destroying the precious environment while allowing Futenma to remain operational. If Koja wins, the force of nature (the soft seafloor) will continue to hinder construction, eventually forcing the Japanese government to adopt a drastic change to the original Henoko plan while keeping Futenma open. This stalemate is likely to continue until the U.S. and Japanese governments begin discussing alternatives to Henoko and Futenma. The question is what would prompt the governments to do so, or what the people of Okinawa, especially politicians, need to do to enable them to do so.

At present, none of the candidates’ platforms address the gradual shifts in global hegemony and its implications for Okinawa’s future. They discuss and envision Okinawa as a potential hub for the economy, tourism, cultural exchange, and peace in Asia; however, they have not articulated or incorporated the evolving global power trajectory from U.S.-dominated unipolarity to multipolarity into their long-term visions for Okinawa. Even Governor Tamaki, who led the establishment of the Regional Diplomacy Department to promote peace diplomacy in Asia within the framework of subnational diplomacy,(22) hardly addressed the shift in the balance of global hegemony in his election platform.

 

Decades of intense political investment—both opposing and supporting the construction of the Henoko base and military bases in general—have created significant social and institutional inertia. For those who oppose it, the stalemate reflects the lopsided power relationship between Okinawa and the Tokyo and U.S. governments. For those who support it, this power relationship has generated economic benefits in land rent, construction, restaurants and bars, and development projects, alongside the immediate burdens of militarization. For both, the stalemate represents and reinforces their understanding that U.S. military power is an immutable reality. This inertia keeps candidates from addressing the geopolitical shift. Concerningly, the candidates’ platforms not only reflect their understanding of U.S. hegemony but could also perpetuate it, thereby hindering their ability to realize their ambitious policies.

Conclusion

International power structures are undergoing significant transformation. The rise of multipolar economic frameworks, such as BRICS, reflects shifting geopolitical realities, and neighbouring Asian and Pacific nations are actively, though cautiously, integrating these realities into their long-term planning.(23)  Some regions of nations have also taken advantage of this transformation by engaging in subnational diplomacy.(24)  These global shifts are creating unprecedented conditions for Okinawa too.  

 

To resolve the enduring issues of Futenma and Henoko and to chart a sustainable path for future generations, Okinawan society and its political leadership must look beyond the military-dominated bilateral frameworks that have long constrained them. We need to recognize the evolving global geopolitical and economic dynamics. We need to articulate this recognition and leverage it with both the Japanese and U.S. governments as we pursue a meaningful path that anchors demilitarization and environmental restoration as a public undertaking. Only through such an endeavor can Okinawa strive to be a hub for the economy, tourism, technological innovation, cultural exchange, and peace in Asia, as it has always aspired to be.

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Notes:

1. Heianna, Sumiyo. 2026. “Henoko kanseishitemo ‘henkansezu’ beikokubososhoga koushikibunde meiki Henoko igaino daitai kassouro yokyu” [U.S. Department of Defense’s official document states ‘no return” of Futenma even after Henoko is completed and demands an alternative runway other than Henoko’s]. The Okinawa Times. February 15, 2026.
https://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/1775448

2. The eight conditions for return of Futenma are: 1. Marine Corps airfield related facilities, etc. will be relocated to Camp Schwab; 2. Marine Corps aviation unit and command function, and related facilities will be relocated to Camp Schwab; 3. Facility improvements for contingency use of JASDF Nyutabaru Air Base and Tsuiki Air Base related to the replacement of MCAS Futenma capabilities will be implemented as necessary; 4. Improved contingency use of civilian facilities for long runway operations that cannot be replicated at the FRF; 5. Avoid creation of traffic congestion and related irritants that might otherwise detract from the quality of life of local residents; 6. Necessary adjustments will be made to adjacent water surface areas; 7. The facility is fully operationally capable; 8. The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2013. “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa April 2013.”

https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/saco/pdf/20130405_okicon_plan_e.pdf

3. United States Government Accountability Office (2017). Marine Corps Asia Pacific Realignment: DoD Should Resolve Capability Deficiencies and Infrastructure Risks and Revise Cost Estimates.
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-415.pdf

4. “Okinawa Kenchijisen hikae Henoko shinchoku kyocho jittaiwa wazuka ichiwari no jiban kairyo owaranu nan kouji” [Ahead of the Okinawa gubernatorial election, Tokyo emphasizes “progress” at Henoko; in reality, only 10 percent of the ground improvement work has been completed, and the difficult construction project shows no signs of ending]. The Okinawa Times. July 17, 2026.  

https://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/1882407

5. “Futenma henkan nagai kassouro kakuhogajyoken beikokubousoshou nihongawa to kuichigai” [Return of Futenma is contingent on securing a long runway, U.S. Department of Defense and Japanese Side are at Odds]. Jiji Tsushin. February 19, 2026.
https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2026021900256&g=int#goog_rewarded

6. “Futenma henkan sogo hitei Koizumi boueiso beigawa ninshiki ni hanron” [Defense Minister Koizumi denies “discrepancies” over return of Futenma and rebuts U.S. position]. Jiji Tsushin. February 20, 2026.

https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2026022001106&g=pol

7. Heianna, Sumiyo. 2026. “Futenma ni rokujyuichi okuen no shinnenryoshisetsu kokubousoushouga setsubikeikaku henkangomo shiyou shiyaka” [The DoD plans to build a new 6.1 billion yen fuel facility at Futenma: Is Futenma's operation under consideration after its return?]. The Okinawa Times. July 20, 2026.

https://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/1884105

8. U.S. Defense Logistics Agency. 2026. “Defense Logistics Agency FY 2027 Military Construction, Defense-Wide ($ in Thousands).” https://comptroller.war.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2027/budget_justification/pdfs/07_Military_Construction/6-Defense_Logistics_Agency.pdf

9."Nenryoshisetsu hantai meikakuni bakuonsoshodan kuni ni yosei Okinawa-Futenma {Aircraft noise lawsuit plaintiff group meets the national government and expresses opposition to fuel tank construction at Futenma]." The Ryukyu Shimpo. August 11, 2026.

https://ryukyushimpo.jp/national/entry-5456412.html

10. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2013. Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa April 2013.

https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/saco/pdf/20130405_okicon_plan_e.pdf

11. U.S. Defense Logistics Agency. 2026. “Defense Logistics Agency FY 2027 Military Construction, Defense-Wide ($ in Thousands).” https://comptroller.war.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2027/budget_justification/pdfs/07_Military_Construction/6-Defense_Logistics_Agency.pdf

12. Okinawa Prefectural Government. 2026. “Beigunkichi kankyo karute rikugun choyu shisetu (Shisetu bango FAC6067)” [U.S. Military Bases Environmental Records: The U.S. Army Fuel Storage Facilities (Facility Number FAC6067)].

https://www.pref.okinawa.lg.jp/_res/projects/default_project/_page_/001/004/872/fac6076_r080317.pdf

13. Ministry of Defense. 2026. 2026 Defense of Japan Pamphlet.  

https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/wp/wp2026/pdf/R08zenpen.pdf

U.S. Department of War. 2026. 2026 National Defense Strategy.

https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF

14. Funaiole, Matthew P. and Hart, Brian. 2025. “China’s Military in 10 Charts.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. September 25, 2025.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-military-10-charts

15. See Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. 2023. The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. Center for Strategic and International Studies.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan

16. “’Chimu Ginowa’ wo kessei beigun Futenma hikojyo no soukihenkan wo motomeru seijiteki tachibakoe nanajyuyon sandou dantai Okinawa” [“Team Ginowan” is to be formed to call for the early return of US Futenma Air Station; 74 organizations endorse the call, transcending political divisions in Okinawa].” The Ryukyu Shimpo. July 27, 2026,

https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/1cdaa564a0d0d8f2b0f3b31dbc1df66bb3b3ff85

17. “Futenmakichi no soukihenkan wo motomeru ‘chimu Ginowan’ ga kessei e [‘Team Ginowan,” calling for the early return of Futenma Air Station, is set to be formed].” Okinawa TV (via Yahoo News). July 22, 2026.

https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/4aa90d1ee8b98952fe9bd1486ff33f3296efac3b

18. “Sakimashicho ‘daitaishisetsu wo hayaku kensetsu surukotoga jyuyo’ chimu Ginowan no shushi wo itsudatu shita yousei Tamakichiji rani” [Mayor Sakima emphasizes to Governor Tamaki and others the importance of early construction of the “replacement facility”: his request deviates from the purpose of Team Ginowan]. The Okinawa Times. July 29, 2026.

19. “’Chimu Ginowan” Sakimashshicho ni Henokoisetuhantai shimin ga shitsumonjyo seimeininai ‘Henoko younin’ ni fumikonda yousei ni kikikan” [Civic members of “Team Ginowan,” who oppose the Henoko relocation, submit a letter of inquiry to Mayor Sakima: Members express a sense of crisis about Sakima’s request because the adopted Statement does not state that Team Ginowan accepts the Henoko plan]. Ryukyu Broadcasting Corporation (via Yahoo News) July 30, 2026.

https://newsdig.tbs.co.jp/articles/-/2839389

20. For discussion on China’s military capabilities in East Asia, see Eric Heginbotham, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Tao Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, et al. 2015. The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017. Rand Corporation.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html

See also Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. 2023. The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. Center for Strategic and International Studies.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan

21. For discussion among the gubernatorial election candidates, Denny Tamaki, Genta Kojya, and Mikio Shimoji, who withdrew from the race, see this clip. The Okinawa Times. July 29, 2026.  

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2JvfalOLIAY

Also see this clip. The Ryukyu Shimpo. July 17, 2026.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YM_x7H6j9Gs

22. Okinawa Prefectural Government. 2024. “Basic Policy for Subnational Diplomacy of Okinawa Prefectural Government.”

https://www.pref.okinawa.lg.jp/_res/projects/default_project/_page_/001/017/561/gaikouhousin.eng.pdf

See also Sasaki, Rena. 2026. “Weaponized paradiplomacy in and around Taiwan: subnational engagement as strategic tool in Sino-Japanese competition.” The Pacific Review.

https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2025.2589168

23. See, for example, Ngamyingsanga, Bhumpat. 2026. “Southeast Asia Global Relations Outlook Part 2: U.S. and China.” Southeast Asia Public Policy Institute. January 07, 2026. 

https://seapublicpolicy.org/part-ii-asean-and-global-horizons/

Also see Suri, Moksh and Sharma, Abhishek. 2023. “South Korea’s Economic Security Dilemma.” The Diplomat. January 25, 2023.

https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/south-koreas-economic-security-dilemma/

24. See, for example, Nandkumar, Karuna. 2025. “Diplomacy at the Periphery: How the PRC’s Border Provinces Shape Neighborhood Engagement.” Borderlands.

https://strategicspace.nbr.org/diplomacy-at-the-periphery-how-the-prcs-border-provinces-shape-neighborhood-engagement/

Also see Liu, Suejun and Thomas, Nicholas. 2026. “The Philippines subnational relations with China: from antechamber to equality?” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies.

https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2026.2657655